The agricultural ministers of China, Japan and South Korea signed an agreement last month to work together to improve food security and increase agricultural trade. In an email interview, Roehlano M. Briones , a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Policy Center and a senior research fellow at the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, discussed East Asian cooperation on food security. WPR: What are the major food security priorities for China, Japan and South Korea, respectively? Roehlano M. Briones : Let me answer this question from the viewpoint of policymakers. For China the major food security priority is to ensure that the population is able to purchase basic food requirements — wheat and rice especially — at stable prices. In this sense it is similar to Indonesia and the Philippines, except those countries tend to emphasize rice. For Japan and South Korea, the priority is to protect or perhaps augment current levels of domestic self-sufficiency in the key staple, rice. WPR: Where do their food security interests converge and where do they diverge, and how will that impact prospects for cooperation? Briones : Food security interests converge typically in areas of technical cooperation. China’s hybrid rice technology, for example, has been widely disseminated throughout Asia. There may be similar types of benefit among the three countries. There is divergence however in the area of trade. Chinese rice may be attractive to consumers in Japan and Korea but blocked by their respective farmer constituencies. In times of crisis, China may also seek to deflect rice stocks away from exports to the domestic market, as was observed in 2008. WPR: How does the trilateral agreement on food security cooperation fit into the context of regional and global (North-South) food security issues? Briones : I am not familiar with the details of food security cooperation of the trilateral agreement. It is clear, though, that China, Japan and South Korea are already cooperating in the context of Association of Southeast Asian Nations integrated food security framework initiatives, namely the ASEAN Food Security Information System, which is currently a technical cooperation project, and the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve. The latter is significant in that it has progressed to a binding intergovernmental agreement toward pooling of designated quantities of food security rice stocks to meet emergency requirements among member countries. It is likely that the trilateral agreement seeks related measures among the three countries as their direct cooperation initiative. Politically, perhaps they are seeking flexible approaches toward cooperation within their Northeast Asian neighborhood, as a complement to ASEAN Plus Three cooperation that is subject to ASEAN centrality and to World Trade Organization cooperation that is subject to global governance frameworks as defined by WTO agreements. Photo: Workers cultivating rice, Java, Indonesia, Jan. 1, 1983 (U.N. Photo by Pernaca Sudhakaran).

Read the original here:
Global Insider: Institutionalized Food Security Cooperation on the Rise in Northeast Asia

In April, three major Brazilian energy companies announced plans to increase investment in Peruvian natural gas. In an email interview, Thomas Andrew O’Keefe , president of Mercosur Consulting Group, discussed Latin America’s intraregional energy ties. WPR: Historically, how strong has intraregional cooperation been on energy issues in South America, and how is that changing? Thomas Andrew O’Keefe : Intraregional cooperation on energy issues went through a boom period in the 1990s, when there was a widespread regional consensus on letting the market set energy prices and permitting the private sector to take a lead role in developing new pipelines and connecting electricity grids across borders. Hence the four gas pipelines built between Argentina and Chile and others from Argentina to Brazil and Uruguay; the gas pipeline from Bolivia to southeastern Brazil; and the interconnection of the electricity grids of Argentina and Brazil, as well as Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The resurgence of resource nationalism and government intervention in setting the price of energy in many key fossil fuel producers at the start of the 21st century threw a monkey wrench into the whole process, however. What we have now is a lot of energy insecurity in South America, although Colombia remains a stable source of electricity and relies primarily on the market to set energy prices and permits private sector participation in the hydrocarbons sector. Brazil and Peru are currently receptive to foreign direct investment in their respective energy sectors, but both are subject to strong political pressures that could potentially change things. WPR: Which South American countries are the most active in the region’s energy sector today, as both the source of and destination for foreign investment? O’Keefe : Brazil, Colombia and Peru. If Uruguay does find major off-shore reserves — currently being explored — it too could emerge as an attractive destination for foreign direct investment in the energy sector, given its stable political and economic environment and long tradition of respecting the rule of law, with solid institutions to back that up. Currently though, Uruguay is a net energy importer — as are Chile and Paraguay — in a continent that is otherwise a net energy exporter. WPR: Which energy sectors are the most integrated, regionally or subregionally, and what are some of the obstacles to further integration? O’Keefe : Central America is by far the most integrated in terms of electricity, although the electric power is generated from a mix of resources that range from locally generated hydropower to imported diesel oil and increasingly natural gas. Colombia is the lynchpin in the Andean subregion, supplying hydroelectric power to its neighbors and potentially in the future to Chile, Central America and even the Caribbean, if the very expensive grid interconnections are ever constructed. Although the cross-border infrastructure for both gas and electricity transmission is there to restore Argentina to its previous role as energy powerhouse for the Southern Cone, it will require that the Argentine government also develop a rational energy policy that takes the country’s best long-term interests into account and is not based solely on short-term political calculations. Sadly, Argentina is not there yet. Unfortunately, Bolivia falls into a similar category: lots of potential with most of the infrastructure in place, but nothing happening until it gets the politics right. Photo: A Brazilian oil platform (Photo by Divulga

The announcement last week that the U.S. is doubling its foreign aid to the Philippines came as the U.S. ally remains locked in a maritime standoff with China over a territorial dispute in the South China Sea. In an email interview, Richard D. Fisher, Jr. , a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, discussed U.S.-Philippines military cooperation. WPR: In what concrete ways is U.S.-Philippines military cooperation being expanded in response to the Philippines’ territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea? Richard D. Fisher, Jr. : After nearly 20 years of U.S. and mainly Philippine indifference following the rancorous exit of U.S. forces from Philippine bases in 1991, there is now an active bilateral dialogue about expanding conventional military cooperation. The change is due in no small part to China’s belligerence and the new pragmatic attitude of Philippine President Benigno Aquino. Though concrete agreements have not been announced, there has been discussion of Washington easing Philippine acquisition of new defense equipment and a more frequent “rotation” of some U.S. forces through Philippine bases that does not constitute “basing.”

Canada’s efforts to join the negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement received a boost last month when Chile agreed to support Canadian participation . In an email interview, Laura Dawson, president of Dawson Strategic , discussed Canada’s attempt to join the negotiations.

Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite declined an invitation by Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski earlier this month to join her Baltic colleagues in Poland to discuss regional security issues ahead of the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. In an email interview, Kinga Dudzinska , an analyst in the Eastern and Southeastern Europe program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, discussed Polish-Baltic relations. WPR: How have Poland’s political and economic relations with the Baltic countries evolved in the post-Cold War period? Kinga Dudzinska : Since Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia regained their independence from the USSR in 1991 and joined the European Union and NATO in 2004, economic relations in the region have stabilized, especially taking into account the crisis in Russia in 1998. Poland, for its part, never achieved high levels of trade with the Baltic states, mainly due to the difference in size and capabilities of their internal markets. However, since 2010, trade is clearly on the rise and already has almost reached precrisis levels. That trend notwithstanding, according to data for 2011, Lithuania is only Poland’s 15th-largest trade partner in the European Union, with Latvia and Estonia even further down in that ranking. However, Poland is an important partner for Lithuania, especially in the agricultural and food sectors, and most companies with Polish capital operate in Lithuania.

Mauritanian President Anerood Jugnauth recently resigned in order to rejoin party politics. In an email interview Deborah Brautigam , professor at American University, discussed the current state of governance and politics in Mauritius. WPR: What is Mauritius’ political culture like? Deborah Brautigam : Domestic politics in Mauritius is partly driven by the recognition that the island country is politically, geographically and economically vulnerable. Recognizing that vulnerability, different coalitions of political leaders have been able to strike a delicate balance, combining astute policies that strive to position Mauritius strategically to catch the waves of globalization with social policies that keep the population from being swept under by these waves. It is rare for any of the main political parties to win enough seats in parliament to take charge of government, so they have to compromise and form coalitions. Sharing power makes for greater realism in policymaking. WPR: Mauritius has a reputation for being a model of democratic governance. To what degree is that deserved, and are there areas where it masks a deeper reality? Brautigam : Mauritius has had an elected legislative council for more than a century. It has very deep democratic roots, and its reputation for being a robust, constitutional democracy is well-deserved. That does not mean, however, that Mauritius is a model of ideal democracy. Rather, it is a good model of real democracy. Real democracy means elections, which in turn means campaigns that need to raise money. This opens the door to corruption, both direct and indirect, and leads to people with money often having a bigger voice than they ought to. Real democracy also means that from time to time, populist leaders arise who manipulate public sentiment in ways that might not be good for the nation. And it means that political families, such as the Jugnauths and the Ramgoolams, have advantages, including name recognition, and can found political dynasties. WPR: What is the underlying social reality on the island, and how is that reflected in or impacted by national politics? Brautigam : The social reality in Mauritius is complicated. Although the economy is far more diversified now than it was at independence in 1968, when it was totally dependent on sugar, a small minority of white Franco-Mauritians still controls not only the best sugar plantation land and beach resorts, but also the country’s other major corporations. Calls to “democratize” the economy are a perennial feature of politics in Mauritius. At the other end socially, one finds an excluded underclass: Mauritians of mainly African descent. In between are the majority Hindus, the Muslims (both are originally from South Asia), Mauritians of mixed race and a small number of ethnic Chinese. Some of these can be divided further, as elements of the caste system are alive and well in Mauritius.

Read the original here:
Global Insider: Mauritius a Model of Real Democracy, Not Ideal Democracy

Last month Uzbekistan stopped the shipment of gas to Tajikistan, a move that Tajikistan qualified as part of an ongoing rail transport and energy blockade . In an email interview, Idil Tuncer Kilavuz, lecturer at Marmara University in Istanbul, Turkey, discussed Uzbekistan-Tajikistan relations. WPR: How have Uzbekistan-Tajikistan relations evolved since the fall of the Soviet Union? Idil Tuncer Kilavuz : Since Uzbekistan and Tajikistan gained independence in 1991, their relations have been poor. Just after the fall of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan experienced a civil war in which Uzbekistan supported the existing Tajikistan leadership, which won the war in 1997. However, relations deteriorated beginning in 1998. Uzbekistan has blamed Tajikistan for attacks on its territory by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan from bases in Tajikistan. Meanwhile, Tajikistan has objected to Uzbekistan’s decision to give shelter to civil war opposition commander Mahmud Khudayberdiev. In addition, relations are strained over issues of border delimitation, energy, transit roads and water use. WPR: What are the main sources of tension between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and what formal or informal conflict-resolution mechanisms are in place? Kilavuz : There are still disputed border areas between the two countries, for which they conduct bilateral negotiations on border delimitation. Talks were suspended in February 2009 over a disagreement about which side would possess the Farkhad water reservoir along the border, but they resumed this year. A major source of tension is the two countries’ mutual dependence. Most of Tajikistan’s exports and imports have to pass through Uzbekistan, which is also Tajikistan’s only external source of natural gas. In addition, Uzbekistan controls roads and railways as well as pipelines and electric power transmission lines to Tajikistan. Meanwhile, Tajikistan controls upstream access to Uzbekistan’s water supply, essential for the production of cotton, a major crop for Uzbekistan. As a result, Uzbekistan strongly opposes Tajikistan’s projects to build the Roghun dam and Sangupta-2 hydroelectric power plant on the Vakhsh River. Uzbekistan claims that water will be withheld in the summer when it is needed to irrigate Uzbekistan’s cotton fields, and released in the winter for electricity. In an effort to apply pressure on Tajikistan, Uzbekistan began to restrict railway traffic to the country in 2010. In addition, Uzbekistan has from time to time suspended gas deliveries to Tajikistan, as Illustrated by this month’s interruption. WPR: What are the regional implications of increased Uzbekistan-Tajikistan tensions? Kilavuz : Increased tensions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will create instability in the region, especially for Tajikistan. Recent suspension of gas supplies by Uzbekistan halted the activity of many major companies, including Tajik Aluminum Company, a major source of income for Tajikistan. The lack of gas was also felt by the population at large. In addition, since there is both a significant Uzbek minority in Tajikistan and a Tajik minority in Uzbekistan, conflict between the two states can cause ethnic tensions in both countries. Finally, many of the region’s features make cooperation necessary to solve common problems. Roads, railways and rivers pass through many international borders, while water, transportation, gas, electricity and agricultural issues connect the interests of all Central Asian countries. However, governments have so far not been successful at cooperating. And even if they have managed their conflicts so that problems did not lead to the use of force, there is no guarantee this state of affairs will continue as long as problems remain unresolved and parties press for their positions instead of trying to reach consensus.

Original post:
Global Insider: Uzbekistan-Tajikistan Tensions Driven by Mutual Dependence

The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Joint Peninsula Shield regional security alliance held a joint naval exercise Sunday and Monday in the Persian Gulf, amid heightened tensions over the recent visit by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Abu Masa, one of three disputed islands in the Gulf claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates. In an email interview, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen , a research fellow at the London School of Economics, discussed the naval capabilities of the GCC countries. WPR: What are the relative naval capabilities, in terms of fleet makeup, training and preparedness, of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries? Kristian Coates Ulrichsen : The GCC states possess significant military resources but struggle to translate these into real-world effectiveness. Their naval capabilities are concentrated on patrol and coastal ships and craft that can protect their offshore oil and gas assets as well as maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf. They have a relatively limited maritime capacity beyond coastal vessels. Saudi Arabia is currently the only GCC state with the naval assets to potentially contribute to maritime security operations beyond its own waters. Major new procurements may change this, as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has recently purchased six French-built multimission corvettes, 24 amphibious assault ships and 70 transport and attack helicopters, while Oman has invested in three offshore vessels and 36 naval helicopters. Although the GCC states’ Joint Peninsula Shield held a naval exercise on April 29-30, the GCC has had very limited success in developing unified naval strategies. They have yet to create truly interoperable forces that would be able to carry out common missions. The naval exercise was named “Islands of Loyalty,” a reference to Iran’s occupation of three UAE islands in the Strait of Hormuz, but the GCC has neither been able to prevent Iranian reinforcement of the islands’ defenses, nor mount any serious attempt to challenge the status quo. WPR: Who are their major international partners, in terms of naval procurement, training and exercises?